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Calling all the Statesmen:  
The (not) Mubarak Trial 
 
   By Lama Abu Odeh 
 
I read the decision that exonerated ex-Minister of Interior of Egypt and his assistants 
from the charge of giving orders to kill demonstrators textually.  Shortcomings known 
to lawyers and journalists who were following the case about failure of performance 
on the part either of prosecutors, lawyers, or the judge overseeing the trial are not 
considered in my reading. You might call it a close reading—specifically, a reading of 
the rationalizing language used by the judge writing the decision to explain his verdict. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
They called it the “trial of the century.” The first time an Arab leader, 
Mubarak, appeared before a civilian (criminal) court to be tried.1 The charge? Giving 
orders to kill demonstrators during the events of late January 2011 that led to his 
overthrow, commonly referred to as “the Egyptian Revolution”.2 He was not the only 
defendant. With him the line-up included his ex-Minister of Interior and six of the 
latter’s assistants who all occupied high positions in Egypt’s various (and, 
apparently, multitudinous) security agencies.3  
 
Mubarak, along with his ex-Minister, were initially declared guilty of charges. 
The verdict was appealed to the Court of Cassation, which overturned it and 
returned it to the Criminal Court of Cairo for retrial. The retrying judge, Chancellor 
Rashidi, reconsidered the facts and issued a decision, spanning 200 pages, in which 
the ex-Minister and his assistants were declared innocent of the charge of acting as 
“accomplice[s] to the crimes of murder of demonstrators.”4 Mubarak was dropped 
                                                        
1 Several cases were joined together and adjudicated at the same time by the same court and they 
included: the charge of giving orders to kill demonstrators, illegal appropriation of public property 
and exporting gas at low prices. Defendants in those joint cases included Mubarak and his sons, Adly, 
his ex Minister of Interior and six of his assistants.  
 
For a sequencing of the various stages the case went through including dates of sessions and stages 
of appeal see: 
https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/ ةمكاحم_ينسح_كرابم  
 
2The judicial text I will be discussing is the one referred to as: 
 A Judicial Statement on the two Criminal Cases Nos 1227, 3643 Year 2011 Qasr Neel. The text was 
issued by Chancellor Rashidi of the Cairo Criminal Court – the retrying court. 
 
3 The agencies involved included: Amn Markazi, Amn Aam, Amn Dawla, Amn Al Qahera, Amn Al Giza 
4 For a critique of the decision based on the external conditions that produced its end result see the 
report by EIPR 
http://eipr.org/pressrelease/2014/11/29/2288 
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from the case by the judge on procedural grounds, a decision that was in turn 
appealed, overturned, and remanded to a lower court.  The lower court had thus far 
met several times to try Mubarak for the charge of killing demonstrators. Mubarak 
failed to appear in any of the sessions.  
 
In this essay, I will discuss the decision by Chancellor Rashidi declaring the 
ex-Minister of Interior and his assistants innocent of the charge of “accomplice” to 
the crime of murder of demonstrators.  
 
The Right Revolution 
 
By the time the court issued its exonerating decision in November of 2014, 
the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 had already transmogrified into something that 
was unrecognizable to those who identified with it as an Event (namely, its activists, 
writers, artists and supporters). The military regime of Sissi appropriated the 
Revolution as an element of a new national narrative according to which the events 
of 2011, while justified, were transcended by the events of June 30, 2013: the 
popular mobilization against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) that 
began on June 30th   and culminated in Sissi taking power on July 3, 2013.  July 3rd 
was declared the proper revolution. Courts, including that of Rashidi, played a very 
important role in promoting this new national narrative.   
 
Soon enough, the initial drive to put the men of Mubarak’s regime on trial, 
especially for cases on corruption, started to lose steam. Many of them, including 
Mubarak’s sons, were declared innocent of charges of corruption. Meanwhile, public 
attention was redirected from the fallen Mubarak regime to the Ikhwan turning 
them into the new object of national obsession. In December 2013, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization. Thousands of its members were 
put in jail. 
 
The Reversal 
 
Rashidi’s decision of declaring Adly and his men innocent of charges was not 
exactly surprising when it was issued since Egyptians were already feeling the 
heavy weight of the post-Ikhwan military regime that emerged from the bosom of 
the old Mubarak one. Nevertheless, it proved devastating to those identified with 
the 2011 revolution. The reversal of the verdict, from guilty to innocent of all 
charges, did not just deliver a blow to the families of the dead and to those who 
were injured, but seemed to also signify a broader and more significant reversal.  If 
the revolution of 2011 stood for the radical act of staring the state down, by the men 
and women protesting on the streets for days chanting “ bread, freedom and social 
justice”, putting this state that had for so long kept them down and under in its 
proper place, screaming “J’accuse”, the reversal of the charges by the court meant a 
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reversal of this very radical act. It represented the state reclaiming its authority, 
staring back down at those revolting men and women, putting them in their place, 
and declaring their revolution nothing more than “fawda” (chaos) and the labor of 
its revolutionaries for naught.  
The martyrs of the revolution – those killed as they protested in the public 
squares across the country- symbolized this labor in its most sacrificial form. Many 
of those martyrs were far from the “youth of the middle class,” celebrated in the 
literature written in the aftermath on the Arab Spring, but belonged to the 
struggling working class. Their participation in the events of January 2011 may have 
been their first experience of politicization;5 their first moment of expressing public 
rage at the state. The court’s reversal treated their lives as expendable; and this 
message hit home for the court’s audience on two levels: let their lives, as 
revolutionaries and as the disenfranchised, fall where they may……as before.  
 
The reversal was the return of “law and order.” But while it was a “return” to 
a previous mode of “ruling”, it was also a return on different terms. The terms of this 
return as well as its difference can be gleaned from the text of Rashidi’s decision. 
The “ruling” doesn’t just decide the rights and wrongs of what happened in late 
January 2011, but it aspires to set the terms for a new relationship of “rule” between 
the men of the state (represented by the accused and their witnesses) and the 
state’s “subjects” (represented by the dead and injured). It does so by introducing a 
third party into the relationship, the Ikhwan, who while exiled from the relationship, 
remain in the background as a conspiring force. It is the presence of this conspiring 
force that determines the “rules” that govern the reordering of “rule” in the post-
revolutionary Egypt: namely, the statesmen protecting the state and its subjects 
from a conniving dark force that lurks in the background, a force that wants to undo 
the state, a force which only the statesmen qua statesmen can see—just like in late 
January 2011.  
 
The Doctrine  
On its face, the doctrinal side of the not guilty verdict issued by Chancellor 
Rashidi of Cairo Criminal Court, was not only well-reasoned, but I would say, 
reasoned in a way one would expect in the case of a police shooting. The defendants, 
Adly and his five assistants, heads of various security (amn) agencies, were charged 
with the crime of acting as “accomplice[s] to murder”. The alleged facts were that 
demonstrators were killed by members of these security agencies and police officers 
during the period of January 25 through January 31, 2011. It was further alleged 
that Adly and his assistants gave these officers orders to shoot at some of the 
demonstrators to deter others from participating, and that Adly and his men gave 
these officers access to firearms and ammunition to carry out these orders. 
Hundreds of people died and many others were injured as a result of those 
shootings.  
 
                                                        
5 In the courts’ papers they appear as: blacksmith, worker in an ironing facility, driver, salesman, 
student, delivery boy, etc.. 
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The text of Rashidi’s decision takes different twists and turns with many 
repetitions and lengthy insertions of dicta, the significance of which I will discuss 
below. Nevertheless, he offers a kernel of a doctrinal argument that is irrefutable. In 
simple terms, Rashidi argues that, according to Egyptian criminal law, for Adly and 
his men to be declared guilty of the charge of “accomplice” to the murder of 
demonstrators four elements must be met:  a) that an act of solicitation and 
encouragement occurred, (i.e., Adly and his men gave instructions to their 
subordinates (police officers) to kill); b) that the officers did, in fact, shoot at the 
demonstrators; c) that when the officers shot at the demonstrators they were 
influenced by the instructions of their superiors, rather than other motivating 
factors like self-defense; d) and that Adly and his men had given the officers access 
to firearms and ammunition in order to carry out the instructions to kill.6 
 
None of the above was established. 
 
While we have dead and injured bodies, Rashidi argued, we don’t have 
“killers.” Some policemen had indeed been arrested and tried for fatal shootings that 
occurred around the police stations where they were serving during the protests, 
but those officers were already declared innocent of charges by other courts.7 No 
criminal actors have been arrested for the vast majority of cases of death and injury 
that occurred during the protests of January 25th to January 30, 2011 (the time 
frame under discussion in the retrial). Rashidi indicates that no direct causal link 
can be drawn between the acts of shooting (actus reus) and the specific deaths.8 
Moreover, even if there was a direct causal link, between specific acts of shooting by 
an identifiable number of policemen and the ensuing result of death or injury, the 
mens rea of the actors still needs to be established.9 These officers may very well 
have shot at demonstrators out of fear for their lives rather than shooting to deter 
demonstrators pursuant to orders given to them by their superiors. Moreover, there 
is no evidence that such orders were given.10 
 
In short, according to the court, Adly and his assistants, were charged with 
being accomplices to those crimes for which neither an act (or), nor a mens rea, nor 
a causal link to the resulting deaths has been identified; and no act of “solicitation or 
encouragement” has been established (the court found no evidence that orders 
                                                        
6 Article 40, Law No. 58 of 1937 Issuing the Penal Code: 
An accomplice to a crime is:  
a) He who solicits another to commit the actus reus of a crime provided this act took place as a result 
of this solicitation; b) he who agrees with another to commit a crime provided the crime was 
committed as a result of this agreement; and c) he who gives an actor or actors a weapon or an 
instrument or any similar thing that was used in the commission of a crime provided he was aware a 
crime using this instrument would take place or he assisted using them in any other way through 
preparation or facilitation or through completion of the crime.  
7 They were deemed to have acted in self-defense as they were defending themselves and their 
station from the trespass and assault by “hooligans”, see Judicial Statement, p. 181 
8 Judicial Statement, p. 180 
9 Judicial Statement, p. 181 
10 Judicial Statement, p. 183 
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were given to kill demonstrators, either written or oral) on the part of Adly and his 
men.  
 
 
Police Culpability 
  
Police culpability is notoriously hard to establish as exemplified by the cases 
of police brutality against African Americans in the U.S. that have gained heightened 
media attention of late as a result of fierce public protests. Rare is the case when a 
police officer is found guilty in a police shooting and, recently, it has become hard to 
indict by grand juries in the first place. What often derails these cases is the problem 
of mens rea. Even if a direct causal link can be drawn between an act of shooting and 
a victim, the mens rea of the officer is hard to establish. An intent to kill has to be 
established that cannot be excused by self-defense. When considering whether this 
excuse applies, courts typically take into consideration what a reasonable man 
standing in the shoes of the police officer would have done. In the case of the police, 
and given the “nature of what they do,” this ultimately ends up being treated in U.S. 
courts as whatever the policeman actually thought when he aimed his gun and took 
the shot; the “reasonable” ends up being nothing more than the “subjective.” In 
short, if the policeman deemed himself in jeopardy, and he shot to protect himself, 
he is exempt from liability for the ensuing death or injury.11  
 
In the case before Rashidi, and given the facts, establishing mens rea becomes 
even trickier, since the shooting occurred in the middle of a protesting crowd and 
concerned multiple actors who were present at the scene.12 Not only were there 
multiple police officers keeping the peace among the protestors, but other covert 
actors as well, the court insisted. There were Ikhwan and there were hooligans 
roaming the streets, who may have had access to firearms stolen from police 
stations as it was established that many had been raided and their ammunition 
stolen. In this case, establishing the specific act that caused the specific death, with 
the legally required mens rea, becomes an impossible task. 
 
“Snitching” 
 
Add to the above, the fraternal culture of the police (the ethos against 
“snitching” as it is called in the U.S.) makes it very difficult to find a witness from 
within the police force to provide testimony against other members of the police. In 
the case before Rashidi, and given the absence of written documents to establish the 
actus reus of complicity (namely, giving instructions to the police to shoot to deter 
demonstrations), the court is left with establishing the actus reus through witnesses 
who attended either the meetings that took place between Adly and the heads of the 
various security agencies or between those heads and members of their own force. 
Such witnesses would have needed to testify that instructions were given orally 
                                                        
11 https://www.thenation.com/article/why-its-impossible-indict-cop/ 
12 Judicial Statement, p 186 
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during those meetings to shoot at demonstrators to deter other participants. No 
such witnesses seem to have been presented to the court.13 To the contrary, several 
witnesses from the various “amn” agencies lined up before the Rashidi court to 
testify that no instructions to shoot for the purposes of deterring demonstrators 
were issued by their superiors, whether in written or oral form.14 Indeed, they all 
insisted that far from being given firearms and instructions to shoot, they were in 
fact given only “helmets, riot shields and batons” and specifically “instructed to 
exercise self-discipline and ensure the safety of the demonstrators”.  
 
So the court says.15  
 
The question of police fraternity would have been all the more urgent since 
the role of the police in the life of citizens was one of the most pressing issues posed 
by the 2011 revolution culminating in demands for radical reforms in the police 
culture and mode of governance. “Securitization” had become the privileged form of 
control under Mubarak with the local police acting as the neighborhood’s supreme 
lord and master. After all, the event that had triggered the demonstrations in the 
first place and given it unprecedented momentum was the circulation of pictures of 
a missing blogger, Khaled Said, dead with his body badly disfigured as a result of 
police torture.  Because the officers and amn officials saw themselves as the very 
target of demonstrators’ ire and felt that their fiefdoms of control were under attack, 
it was to be expected that the various men of amn would band together and refuse 
to “snitch” on each other or their superiors.    
 
No instructions to shoot were given, and no firearms were provided for use 
in demonstrations. The preponderance of evidence was such, the court declared. 
                                                        
13 Police fraternity has put a halt to prosecution in the Freddie Gray case of Baltimore in the US only 
very recently because the prosecutor found it impossible to find a policeman who would step 
forward to provide testimony that might establish the case a fellow officer. 
14 Add to that the court was presented with several witnesses, namely, superiors of those who 
conducted the meetings to testify that they had actually not “witnessed any shooting in the public 
squares,” or that “the reports landing on their desks did not indicate police shooting had taken place,” 
or that “it would be difficult to believe that orders to shoot demonstrators were given by ex Minister 
Adly since this would be very “stupid” on his part”. Judicial Statement, pp 175-180 
15 Instead, the court provided an alternative scenario of who the possible shooters could have been 
that killed the demonstrators: first, the pro Ikhwan rioters who had raided police stations in the 
various provinces, ransacked their arms supply and released their prisoners; second, police officers 
trying to defend themselves in these police stations from the pro-Ikhwan invaders (though this 
would have happened far from the public squares where crowds of demonstrators gathered and 
where the deaths and injuries the subject of the trial occurred); and third, “arrogant officers with an 
aggrandized sense of self, the pervert few, who were acting on their own behalf and defying orders of 
superiors”. In other words, if no instructions were given to police officers to shoot to deter, then 
those who actually shot and killed in the public squares would have been either the pro-Ikhwan 
sympathizers with appropriated guns from ransacked police stations or the disobeying policemen 
who carried firearms and shot contrary to given instructions. Either way, defendants of the case, Adly 
and five assistants, could not be held guilty as accomplices to criminal acts committed by such actors. 
See Judicial Statement, p 125 
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Liberal Legalism in the Service of the Revolution 
 
I made the analogy to cases of police brutality in the U.S. to lay the 
groundwork for my argument and to establish that, on its face, Chancellor Rashidi’s 
decision that there is no “preponderance of evidence that Adly and his assistants 
were guilty of crimes charged”, was not altogether unreasonable. This is to say that 
the facts and the law allow for a conclusion such as the one he made, and there is 
nothing suspicious about the decision at first blush, my sympathies with the 
revolution and horror at the lost lives of its martyrs aside.  
 
In fact, I think, if Rashidi’s decision was confined to making the doctrinal 
argument above, it is possible that his audience, including some sympathetic with 
the revolution, would have regarded the decision as having satisfied the liberal 
legalist requirement of judicial “objectivity and neutrality.” Such an audience could 
see him as having thrown his hands in the air so to speak having done the best he 
could as a judge, given the evidentiary and substantive limitations of criminal law 
(formally, the preponderance of the evidence standard for establishing facts and, 
substantively, strict requirements as to causal links and mens rea). Had the judge 
referred to the events of January 25th through January 30, 2011 in neutral terms, 
had he not given a hint as to his own views of those events, either favorable or 
otherwise, had he not shown any affinity to the accused nor dismissed the dead and 
injured out of hand; Rashidi could have made the exact same doctrinal argument 
from the criminal law, resulting in the same not guilty verdict, and the decision 
would have been seen as, it seems to me, a perfectly respectable one. Either side 
would have made claim to it as their own. The state would have cheered the release 
of its men, and the revolutionaries would have been assured of an independent 
judiciary even as it would have left the families of the dead and injured empty 
handed. They would have found a way to mourn their dead and nurture their 
injuries outside the courts of law.  
 
It would have been a victory of liberal legalism. 
  
Alas, that was not what happened. The decision spanned 200 pages, and the 
doctrinal argument, though repeated several times, only accounted for about three 
to four of those pages.  
 
 
Calling All the Statesmen 
 
Far from using the liberal legalist argument, which I am calling the “doctrinal 
argument”, to establish an objective and neutral posture, presaging a different 
judiciary in a different future liberal legalist state, the court framed the doctrinal 
argument with dicta, and plenty of it, aimed at re-state(ing) the broken Mubarak 
state (i.e., re-establishing the lost authority of the state embodied by its statesmen). 
In other words, what the court did was not only declare the accused innocent of 
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charges but also put its argument to use. Specifically, it deployed it in the service of 
the state, or rather, in the service of re-stating the state. In the aftermath of a 
revolution that seems to have rattled the confidence of the states(men) in their 
dominance (evidenced by the very fact of their trial before a civilian court for acts 
they had long perceived to be of the state), the court rushed not so much to 
characterize their acts (killing demonstrators) as legitimate, but to exonerate them 
of such acts by transferring criminal liability to others (the Ikhwan, as rogues and 
renegades of the state).  The state was then re-stated on different terms than before: 
from impunity to kill (the regime of Mubarak) to the wrongly accused (the new 
regime).    
 
And what is this state that is being re-state(d) according to the court? One 
begins to glean the nature of this state from a close reading of the Chancellor 
Rashidi’s representation of the parties to the case in the text of his decision.  
 
I will offer a quote from the decision that reveals much about the orientation 
of the court: 
 
…as the court proceeds to consider evidence against the accused of the 
charges of solicitation and assistance [to kill demonstrators], it finds 
itself obliged to first point out, dismayed as it is by the unprecedented 
attacks directed at the innocence verdicts given by the grand judicial 
authorities of criminal courts in this country, and at those heads and 
officers of the police who have already been tried for the same acts of 
“solicitation and assistance” during the same period as the one under 
consideration…… and in an attempt to clarify the truth of the matter 
and to preserve the collective memory of the Egyptian people of what 
had in fact transpired during that same period, from the point of view 
that the homeland is eternal and it is the duty of the judiciary to answer 
to the call of justice and justice only as the embodiment of the 
conscience of the people, that rules without “ruling over”…the court 
would like therefore to write with the ink of justice what has settled in 
its conscience as to the events that had actually taken place during that 
same period, as historical record for future generations, and based on 
information that the court has collected,  having listened to the 
testimonies under oath of those the court considers to be the sages and 
guardians of the homeland, whose secrets they carry in their 
minds and have articulated in their testimonies before the court 
and they are, Tantawi….Nazeef…Anan…etc.…these men have 
occupied positions of authority and leadership in the state and its 
various agencies (intelligence, information, security) or presided 
over executive authority, some of whom still occupy position of 
power, training future leaders.. elites always known for their 
truthfulness forcing this court to use their testimonies to decipher 
the truthfulness of the charges directed at the accused….and the 
upshot of those testimonies is that there is an American Israeli 
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international plan to divide the middle East to the smallest number of 
states so that the Zionist entity remains the most important and most 
dominant…through the mobilization of the organization of Al 
Qaeda and some of those hiding behind the cloak of religion, ….the 
axis of evil consisting of the US, Israel, Iran, Turkey, Qatar proceeded to 
execute this plan either through war ….or alternatively through 
programs on “Democracy and Governance” which they described as the 
wars of the fourth generation in which they aim to undermine the ruling 
regimes through religious and sectarian strife….aided by media outlets 
that kept talking ad nauseam about the discontents of youth (albeit 
real), …some foreign NGOs invited some of the youth to train them 
through workshops on how to protest, demonstrate, go on strikes,  how 
to deal with security men, suggesting to them that that revolution 
against their rulers is only a question of time, …giving them money to 
finance their NGOs even if at the expense of money earmarked for their 
own government, and this was what was implemented on the 
ground by organizations hiding behind the cover of religion…….all 
of this coincided with the worsening of the conditions of ordinary 
Egyptians in all aspects of life, political, economic, social, security wise, 
not to speak of a frozen regime slow in deciding…few of those chosen 
Egyptians lost patience and protested on the streets screaming: Life, 
Liberty and Social Justice…. So a revolution, by the will of God took 
place on January 25, 2011 but the leaders of the Ikhwan, whose 
organization had penetrated state institutions supported by 
outside forces, moved on three fronts: the first to take over the 
government with a view to establishing the caliphate; the second 
to influence the protestors with ideas about Islamic conquest 
having succeeded in planting their followers, outlaws as well as 
simple people who have long suffered from the bad treatment of 
the police, among protestors to spread chaos and upheaval, and 
third, with the cooperation of some of the Bedouins of Sinai, the Ikhwan 
received on January 27, 2011 fighters form the Jaysh Al Islam, Izz Elddin 
Al Qassam, Hizbollah and Hamas …who snuck into Egypt carrying 
advanced arms, mines, bombs, and ammunition- some of which had 
been sent by the Egyptian government to Hamas to assist the 
Palestinians- and they attacked on January 28, 2011 police stations and 
public property in various provinces: destroying, burning, stealing…they 
raided prisons using violence and released a total of 23710 some of 
whom are known leaders of the Ikhwan, and raided ammunition 
storehouses-bragging about all this on television channels- killed and 
injured policemen trying to guard the prison, stole police cars which in 
the dawn hours of January 29, 2011 were seen driven around in Gaza. 
Meantime, the militia of Ikhwan dispersed wreaking havoc in the 
land with the ammunition they had stolen and the weapons they 
had brought from the outside…exploiting the deterioration of the 
police force whose sole purpose had become to guard the palace of the 
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president, all of which established the fact that the handling of the 
protestors was the task of a majority of police officers using water 
cannons and tear gas following instructions they were given, and a 
wayward few who shot at protestors using their own discretion and in 
violation of instructions given by their superiors. This was exploited by 
the Ikhwan militias who started shooting sometimes at the police 
officers other times at the protestors themselves from near 
distances, from far corners, from roofs of buildings, hitting and 
killing many in a war of the streets …seeking to turn it into a civil 
war, meantime decrying the police and the military claiming 
falsely they were the ones killing the protestors, and on another 
front, working to undermine the standing of the judiciary, the 
Egyptian military, media…but fortunately in a moment of divine 
design a new spirit was breathed into this people on July 3, 2013,, 
followed by the police and the military to reclaim their original 
revolution that had been captured by the Ikhwan presaging the new 
birth for the modern history of the Egyptian state. 
 
 
So what is this state that the court was re-stating in its decision? 
 
First, the men of the state, of security (amn) and of the military, who are 
represented in the case before the court by the defendants and their witnesses . 
Those men consistently appear in the language of the court to be trustworthy, 
knowledgeable, and wise, men who always keep the public interest in mind. Those 
men speak authoritatively on how the events that rattled the state in January 2011 
and lead to the death of the demonstrators should be understood. Those men are 
the designated witnesses to the “state” of affairs whose word on this state is 
irrefutable (immune from counter evidence); they are the rulers. 
 
Second, the subjects of the state and they are represented by the dead and 
injured protestors, the victims and their families. “They” appear in the court’s 
discourse as having a faint grasp of the facts, being driven by a biased and narrow 
perspective of the events, being prone to believing rumors, basing their testimonies 
on hearsay, and, worse still, as liars. The families of the injured presented the court, 
according to Rashidi, with false medical reports about the state of their bodies 
before they died or were injured falsely suggesting to the court that it was the 
“bullet” that killed or injured them.16 In fact, looked at more closely, the court found 
that there was barely any dead or injured to account for: they were either out-of-
place (outside the place of the events that were under discussion in the case), or 
out-of-history (outside the time framework of the events that were under discussion 
in the case). But perhaps their biggest shortcoming was failure to see that behind 
their justified protests, lurked a conspiring force in their midst, the Ikhwan, who 
                                                        
16 According to the court, their lies were exposed by the medical reports presented to the court by 
the state appointed coroner.  
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fooled and seduced them by pretending to be, like they, protesting the regime of 
Mubarak in good faith, while what the Ikhwan really sought to do was bring down 
the state. So the “dead” and their families, standing in for the protestors writ large, 
themselves standing in for the state’s subjects were represented as: ignorant, 
irrational, and seduce-able. For all of the reasons above, they were the subjects of 
the state who needed the state and its statesmen to clarify to them the real “state” of 
affairs. They are the ruled. 
 
Third, the infiltrators seeking to undermine the state and they are 
represented in the discourse of the court by the Ikhwan and their external and 
internal accomplices (Hamas militias, the U.S., Israel, Turkey, Qatar, Egyptian NGOs 
financed by outsiders, etc.). The infiltrators, having plotted for years to undermine 
Egypt, destroy its institutions, and steal its resources, not only succeeded in 
infiltrating the demonstrations, according to the court, but they also “lit them up 
with blood” as they had always planned to do.  
 
As the quote above shows, the court wrote a great many words describing 
the nature of this third party—the glue that binds the statesmen (first party) to the 
ruled (second party) and makes their relationship as such necessary.  
 
In other words, in the aftermath of a revolution that shook up the 
statesmen’s faith in their hegemony, a paranoid nationalist narrative about a lurking 
conspiracy in which the outside and the inside had joined forces to overthrow the 
state of Egypt, was what was needed to put the overthrown statesmen back in 
power over their subjects.   
 
The Varied Treatment of the Witnesses’ Testimony 
 
What distributed the parties to the respective positions of “ruler/statesman” 
and “ruled/subject” was not just in the words the court used to describe each but it 
was also through the distribution of tone, affect, and posture of quick-to-believe the 
former, hard-to-believe-the latter. It was this tone that permeated the court’s text 
and clued the reader into the hierarchical ordering apace in the court’s thinking. 
 
While an excess of authority was given to the testimonies of those testifying 
on behalf of the defendants, the testimonies of those testifying on behalf of the 
victims was met with a cruel dismissiveness, bordering on contempt.17  
 
First, the testimony of the statesmen was reinforced by introducing the 
testimony of their superiors to indirectly speak to what those men of amn had 
claimed. This occurred, as in the quote above, when the court inserted dicta into the 
                                                        
17 One suspects of course that the medical reports by the state’s coroner presented to the court may 
have been falsified or some of the witnesses may have lied or gave partial testimonies. None of that is 
apparent to the reader of the decision. What is apparent is the different representation of the 
respective testimonies. 
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middle of its decision expounding on the conspiracy against Egypt by Ikhwan and 
their accomplices. Amr Solayman, Vice President; Hassan Tantawi, Head of Military 
Council; Ahmad Mahmood Nazif, Prime Minister; Murad Mowafee, Head of 
Intelligence; Sami Anan, Chief of the Military, and others,18 were all quoted to make 
the point. All of them were Mubarak’s men whose regime the court decried in its 
reframing of the events that led to the revolution (see quote above). Yet, Chancellor 
Rashidi declared that he drew on those statesmen’s testimonies to “infer the truth of 
the charges against the accused”. In other words, Rashidi declared that in order for 
him to decipher the course of events that took place on those days in late January 
2011, the “big picture” that framed those events needed to be represented to the 
decision’s audience, and for this picture to be represented, the men of amn’s 
superiors have to be consulted for their wisdom and expertise. And what do these 
superior Statesmen have to say? Because there is a conspiracy against Egypt, the 
protestors (the victims) have to renew their faith in their statesmen (the 
defendants).  
 
Second, in considering the case for the victims, the court dropped from its 
consideration many of the cases of the dead and injured. Here, the court moves 
quickly and makes short and regimented arguments. No surplus of words; no dicta. 
It removed five cases from consideration by arguing that those deaths occurred 
“outside the time frame under consideration in this case”. It removed 103 cases 
from consideration by arguing their death occurred “outside the place frame of the 
case under consideration”. It removed 95 cases from consideration by arguing that, 
“relatives couldn’t specify where bullets came from as they were not present when 
incident occurred”. It kept only 36 cases on its docket for consideration. Then, those 
36 cases were duly dismissed because the “place of death was unspecified,” the “the 
instrument of death was unspecified,” or there was “no autopsy” conducted on the 
corpse.  
 
As for the injured all their cases were dismissed because they were “injured 
by an instrument not known to be used by the police,” the “place of injury was 
unspecified,” the “evidence was inconclusive,” the “testimony [was] based on 
hearsay,” the “medical report was disavowed by the hospital issuing it,”  “there were 
no medical reports offered to the court on the claimed injury,”  the “injured 
appeared just fine, no sign of injury,” the “injured has original medical impairment 
which could have caused the injury,” reports “claimed beating by police could not 
have produced injury presented, “  “he is more likely stabbed by a civilian,” or 
“injury was claimed to have inflicted by snipers and police do not use snipers!” 
 
Just like that. By the time you’re done reading this part of the decision, you 
wonder whether anyone was, in fact, killed or injured those late days of January 
2011. And I think that’s precisely what Rashidi meant to do. The total dismissal of all 
the cases, without a single exception, was meant to establish the fact that there was 
no “result” with which the court has to contend. Even if there were instructions to 
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shoot, even if policemen, in fact, shot, there were no dead or injured. It was a 
victimless crime. The fact that anyone died was all rumor, just hearsay. It’s what 
your neighbor told you after he had heard it from his friend who worked as a nurse 
in the hospital and attended to an injured person who had told him he was shot in 
the demonstrations.  
 
Case closed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While Chancellor Rashidi wrote a decision that was reasonably argued on 
doctrinal grounds, he undermined his case by mistreating the respective 
testimonies of the witnesses. The radical credulousness he applied to those 
testifying on behalf of the defendants contrasted with the radical skepticism he 
applied to the witnesses of the victims, to the point of almost complete erasure of 
the latter, “undid” much of the posture of objectivity and neutrality he had 
established in making the doctrinal case.  
 
Moreover, Rashidi inserted several pages of dicta in the middle of the opinion 
in which he marshaled the testimony of the statesmen of the Mubarak regime to 
opine on the presence of a conspiracy planned by the Ikhwan and others against the 
state of Egypt. In this dicta, he used the statesmen’s testimony as a means of 
“inferring” what happened “during the time frame of the case under consideration.” 
The stock he put in this testimony showed that Rashidi had something else in mind 
beyond establishing the rights and the wrongs of the case before him. Through the 
evocation of the Ikhwan conspiracy, Rashidi suggested both that the Ikhwan should 
be considered an “unnamed” third party to the case, as they may very well have 
been the ones who had shot at the protestors, and that the Ikhwan existed as a 
hostile force lurking in the background, unseen by the naïve and innocent 
protestors, seeking to undermine the state of Egypt. All the more reason, then, for 
the protestors to reconcile with their statesmen who were not only wrongly accused 
but whose “statesmanship” was absolutely necessary in the face of this looming 
threat. 
 
Rashidi had a few good things to say about judges, too. 
 
 
 
 
